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—  Note  — 
May Contain  
Unvaccinated Children:  
Imposing a Duty to Warn in the 
Context of Nonmedical 
Childhood Vaccine Exemptions 
Abstract 
Vaccines are one of the “ten great public health achievements” in 
the twentieth century according to the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention. Yet as a growing number of states allow exemptions 
from mandatory vaccination laws for religious, philosophical, and 
personal reasons, nonvaccination rates are on the rise. At the 
community level, increased exemptions lead to reduced herd 
immunity and increased vaccine-preventable outbreaks. 
This Note addresses the community issues by applying a concept 
from tort, products liability, and food safety law: the duty to warn. 
Ultimately, this Note suggests imposing a duty to warn the public 
(and particularly vulnerable individuals who rely on herd immunity 
because they cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons) about 
vaccination levels in schools and day-care facilities. With such a 
warning, vulnerable individuals can avoid exposure to low-vaccination 
areas and reduce their risk of contracting injurious, preventable 
diseases. This duty to warn balances the interests of parents seeking 
exemptions and vulnerable individuals seeking to avoid harm. 
The data required for such a warning—aggregate immunization 
rates—already exist because many states require schools and day-care 
facilities to report such data to public health officials. Moreover, 
publicly disseminating vaccination levels in the aggregate would avoid 
privacy issues. The warning should be required by statute, creating a 
standardized system that is easily understood and simplifies facility 
comparison. Covered entities would be required to publicly post their 
current vaccination levels as green, yellow, or red, thus building on 
the public’s familiarity with the stoplight paradigm: green is good, 
yellow means caution, and red signals stop or avoid. The statutory 
limits for each color would be based on herd immunity thresholds and 
the Healthy People 2020 goals. Effectiveness could be increased by 
adding emotional indicators: a smiling face with green and a frowning 
face with red. If successful, the warning could be expanded to other 
entities such as pediatrician offices. 
  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
May Contain Unvaccinated Children 
1868 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1868 
I.  Vaccine Policy Background........................................................... 1870 
A.  A Brief History of Mandatory Vaccination Laws, Their 
Constitutionality, and the Inclusion of Nonmedical Exemptions ...... 1871 
B.  Current Policies and Trends ............................................................. 1873 
C.  Effect of Exemptions on Individuals and Communities ..................... 1875 
D.  Negative Externalities and Strategies to Address Them .................... 1877 
II.  Legal Basis for the Proposed Duty to Warn .......................... 1878 
A.  Negligent Failure to Warn................................................................. 1878 
B.  Product Defect Liability and Allergen Warnings ............................... 1881 
C.  Mandated Warnings: The Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2004 ..................................................................... 1883 
D.  Application in Infectious Disease Cases ............................................ 1885 
III.  Proposed Duty to Warn and Regulation .................................. 1887 
A.  Scope and Statutory Considerations .................................................. 1887 
B.  Potential Benefits .............................................................................. 1890 
C.  Potential Limitations ......................................................................... 1893 
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 1893 
Appendix ........................................................................................................ 1895 
Introduction 
“We got into Wellington!” Already eager to relocate your family 
to beautiful San Diego, your excitement grows exponentially knowing 
your children will attend such a prestigious private school. But then, 
by chance, you learn that over half of the school’s kindergarteners are 
unvaccinated. You feel overcome with relief realizing what a fortunate 
discovery this is: Sam, one of your children, is unvaccinated due to 
severe allergies and, as a result, relies on the protective herd 
immunity created when others are vaccinated.1 Being exposed to other 
unvaccinated children significantly increases Sam’s risk of contracting 
a disease2 that could leave him paralyzed, brain damaged, deaf, or 
 
1. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. Herd immunity is reached 
when a threshold number of people are vaccinated such that disease 
transmission is dramatically reduced in a community. People who are 
unvaccinated benefit indirectly from this reduced disease transmission 
because it limits their exposure to vaccine-preventable diseases. 
2. See, e.g., Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to School 
Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State 
Policies with Pertussis Incidence, 296 JAMA 1757, 1762 (2006) 
(“Children with nonmedical exemptions are at increased risk of disease 
and they increase community risk of disease transmission. From 1985 
through 1992, exemptors in all states were 35 times more likely to 
contract measles than nonexempt children. In Colorado, exemptors were 
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even dead.3 Using the map of San Diego school vaccination rates you 
fortuitously found,4 you select another school that better balances 
Sam’s needs for quality education and a safe—that is, vaccinated—
learning environment.  
But what if this database didn’t exist? The San Diego map 
represents a unique resource provided by a local nonprofit watchdog 
group; similar information is not readily available in other areas. 
Parents have some options: if they are savvy, they can find reports for 
their state, and sometimes region, through their local public health 
authority5 or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC);6 
or parents can call public and school officials to inquire about 
community and school-level vaccination data if they are available. 
But what about less savvy parents, or parents who don’t know about 
herd immunity? And what about other entities such as day-care 
facilities, where children can foreseeably be exposed to unvaccinated 
and even infected children? What if avoiding areas with high 
exemption rates was more like avoiding allergens in food products, 
where allergic individuals know and trust that warnings like 
“Contains peanuts” will be posted where food should be avoided? 
This Note proposes a statutorily imposed duty to warn in the 
context of vaccine exemptions, allowing medically exempted children 
and their parents to avoid exposure to areas with high vaccine 
exemptions and thus reducing the risk of contracting an injury-
 
22 times more likely to have had measles and 5.9 times more likely to 
have had pertussis than vaccinated children.”) (citations omitted). 
3. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
4. This introduction is inspired by a map that allows San Diego parents to 
search for vaccination coverage by school. Ryann Grochowski, San 
Diego County Kindergarten Vaccination Rates 2012–2013, inewsource. 
org, http://inewsource.org/data-tables/sandiego-vaccination-exemption 
-map-2012/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
5. E.g., Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., Vaccination Coverage Levels in 
Texas Schools, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/immunize/coverage/schools.sht
m (reporting at state, heath service region, and county levels) (last updated 
Oct. 14, 2013); Va. Dep’t of Health, Annual Virginia Vaccination Survey 
(last updated Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/epidemiology/ 
immunization/datamanagement/vaimmsurvey.htm (reporting at the state 
level).  
6. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Annual School Assessment 
Reports (last updated Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-
managers/coverage/school-survey/assessment-reports.html (reporting 
state-level vaccination rates); see also Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten—
United States, 2011–12 School Year, 61 Morbidity & Mortality 
Wkly. Rep. 647, 648–51 (2012) [hereinafter 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten 
Report] (same), modified by errata, 61 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. 
Rep. 981, 994 (2012). 
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inducing, vaccine-preventable disease. The warning would be imposed 
on schools and day-care facilities, and could be expanded to other 
entities, such as pediatrician offices, if successful. The warning would 
be statutorily imposed, creating a standardized system that would be 
easily understood by the public and allow for comparison across 
facilities. The warning would build on people’s familiarity with the 
stoplight paradigm: green is good, yellow indicates caution, and red 
signals stop or avoid. The statutory limits for each color could be 
based on herd immunity thresholds for common diseases and the 
Healthy People 2020 goals.7  
Each entity would then be required to publicly post its 
vaccination coverage level using green, yellow, or red. Effectiveness 
could be increased further by combining colors with emotional 
indicators, such as a simple happy face graphic with green and a sad 
face with red.8 Consumers would then be able to avoid red and yellow 
areas and reduce their risk exposure.  
Part I begins by discussing current vaccine policy, vaccination 
trends, negative externalities that result from religious- and 
philosophical-based vaccine exemptions, and previously recommended 
strategies for addressing those negative externalities. Part II then 
presents and analyzes the legal basis for a duty to warn in the vaccine 
exemption context, looking at general negligence law, products 
liability law and allergen warning requirements, the Food Allergen 
Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, and previous case law 
addressing duties to warn where contagious diseases are involved. 
Finally, as alluded to above, Part III details the proposed warning, 
including its scope, regulatory considerations, potential benefits, and 
potential limitations.  
I. Vaccine Policy Background 
The CDC lists vaccination as one of the “ten great public health 
achievements” in the twentieth century.9 Because of vaccines, 
smallpox has been eradicated and morbidity for other infectious 
diseases—including diphtheria, polio, measles, mumps, rubella, and 
haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib)—has been reduced by 99–100% 
since 1900.10 State-based mandatory vaccination laws gave effect to 
the powerful tool found in vaccines and “played a substantial role in 
 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 121–22 for proposal details and infra 
note 30 and accompanying text for information on Healthy People 2020.  
8. See infra text accompanying notes 123–26. 
9. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ten Great Public Health 
Achievements—United States, 1900–1999, 48 Morbidity & Mortality 
Wkly. Rep., 241, 241 (1999). 
10. Id. at 245–46. 
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[generating the significant] disease reductions.”11 But increased 
nonmedical exemptions to vaccination laws threaten herd immunity 
and create negative externalities for communities and individuals who 
are unable to be vaccinated.  
A. A Brief History of Mandatory Vaccination Laws, Their 
Constitutionality, and the Inclusion of Nonmedical Exemptions 
Cities and states began passing mandatory vaccination laws in the 
early nineteenth century in response to several smallpox outbreaks.12 
In 1809, Massachusetts passed the first vaccination law requiring its 
citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox.13 Less than twenty years 
later, in 1827, Boston passed the first school vaccination law requiring 
proof of smallpox vaccination for children entering the public school 
system.14 Other states followed suit, and by 1905, many Americans 
found themselves under a legal obligation to be vaccinated.15  
With this legal obligation, however, came strong and—to this 
day—unwavering resistance based on several grounds, including: 
doubted efficacy, safety concerns, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
and liberty interests that call for minimal government interference 
with individuals’ personal choices.16 Those opposed to mandatory 
vaccinations refused to comply with vaccine requirements and took 
action to repeal and challenge the existing laws.17   
11. Walter A. Orenstein & Alan R. Hinman, The Immunization System in the 
United States—The Role of School Immunization Laws, 17 Vaccine Supp. 
3, S19, S19–20 (1999). Generally, there is no federal requirement for 
immunization. Id. at S22. One exception to this is military service members, 
for whom the Department of Defense can require immunization. Lawrence 
O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint 381 (2008). 
12. Gostin, supra note 11, at 379.  
13. Id.; Orenstein & Hinman, supra note 11, at S20. 
14. Gostin, supra note 11, at 379; see also James G. Hodge Jr. & Lawrence 
O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, And 
Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J., 831, 850 (2002) (noting the connection 
between compulsory education and public school policies and the 
subsequent development of compulsory vaccination laws). 
15. Gostin, supra note 11, at 379, 653 n.39; see also Hodge Jr, & Gostin, 
supra note 14, at 851 (“The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
incorporated its own school vaccination law in 1855, New York in 1862, 
Connecticut in 1872, and Pennsylvania in 1895. Other northeast states 
soon passed their own requirements. The trend toward compulsory child 
vaccination as a condition of school attendance eventually spread to 
states in the Midwest (e.g., Indiana (1881), Illinois and Wisconsin 
(1882), Iowa (1889)), South (e.g., Arkansas and Virginia (1882)), and 
West (e.g., California (1888)) . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
16. See, e.g., Hodge Jr. & Gostin, supra note 14, at 844–49. 
17. E.g., Gostin, supra note 11, at 379, 653 n.40; Hodge Jr. & Gostin, 
supra note 14, at 851. 
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When the issue came to the Supreme Court in 1905, the Court 
unequivocally held that states can require vaccination under the 
police power, which authorizes states to pass “reasonable 
regulations . . . [to] protect the public health and the public safety.”18 
Seventeen years later, the Court affirmed that cities and states can 
exclude unvaccinated children from public schools “for the protection 
of the public health.”19  
In an unfortunate turn for vaccine challengers, the Court in 
Jacobson stressed a state’s authority to pass vaccination laws even 
where individual liberties may be at stake, stating: “[T]he liberty 
secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . does not import 
an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all 
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”20 Moreover, various 
jurisdictions have consistently held that the Americans are not 
constitutionally entitled to nonmedical exemption from mandatory 
vaccination laws.21 Despite this lack of obligation, the majority of 
states permit individuals to obtain vaccine law exemptions based on 
religious or philosophical beliefs.22 
While states passed the first vaccination laws in response to 
smallpox, measles drove the enactment of modern vaccination laws. 
As Walter A. Orenstein and Alan R. Hinman stated, “It was control 
of a real disease rather than reaching an immunization coverage 
target which spurred school law efforts.”23 Several facts supported the 
push for broader and more strictly enforced vaccination laws. First, 
measles primarily affected school-age children,24 and officials identified 
schools as “major sites of transmission.”25 Second, officials learned 
from the experiences of states with enforced school vaccination laws: 
in the 1970s, these states’ measles incidence rates were forty to fifty-
one percent lower than those of their counterpart states with no 
school vaccination laws.26 In 1977, the nationwide Childhood 
 
18. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
19. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). 
20. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
21. Gostin, supra note 11, at 382–83; Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, 
Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and Individual 
Rights, in Law in Public Health Practice 349 (Richard A. 
Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
22. See infra note 35–36 and accompanying text.  
23. Orenstein & Hinman, supra note 11, at S20. 
24. Seventy-one to eighty-three percent of reported measles cases for the years 
1973–77 occurred in children aged five to nineteen years. See id. at S20–21. 
25. Id. at S20. 
26. Malone & Hinman, supra note 21, at 344; Orenstein & Hinman, supra 
note 11, at S20–21.  
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Immunization Initiative helped encourage states to pass and strictly 
enforce school vaccination laws,27 and by 1980, vaccination rates for 
children entering school reached ninety-six and ninety-five percent for 
measles and polio, respectively.28 
B. Current Policies and Trends 
The CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP) currently recommends vaccinating children against sixteen 
diseases: hepatitis A and B, rotavirus, diphtheria, tetanus, acellular 
pertussis, Hib, pneumococcus, poliovirus, influenza, measles, mumps, 
rubella, varicella, meningococcus, and human papillomavirus.29 
Additionally, Healthy People 2020, a collection of national health 
objectives created by a coalition of federal agencies,30 sets a target 
kindergarten coverage level of ninety-five percent for five vaccines 
covering nine diseases: DTAP (immunizing against diphtheria, 
tetanus, and acellular pertussis), MMR (immunizing against measles, 
mumps, and rubella), polio, hepatitis B, and varicella.31 
But the ultimate authority for determining vaccination 
requirements—including diseases covered, dosage levels, and age 
thresholds—falls with the states.32 All fifty states require some level of 
vaccination as a condition for attending both public and private 
schools; additionally, although definitions vary by state, all fifty states 
require vaccination for children attending child care facilities and 
programs.33 All states exempt from these requirements children who 
cannot receive the recommended vaccines for medical reasons.34 All 
 
27. Gostin, supra note 11, at 380; Malone & Hinman, supra note 21, at 344–45. 
28. Orenstein & Hinman, supra note 11, at S23. 
29. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP): Recommended Immunization Schedule 
for Persons Aged 0 Through 18 Years—United States, 2013, 
62 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 2, 4 (Supp. 2013), modified by 
errata, 62 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 237, 256 (2013). 
30. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2020 Topics & Objectives—
Objectives A–Z, Healthy People.gov (last updated Nov. 13, 2013),  
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/default.aspx.  
31. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Immunization & Infectious 
Diseases: Objective IID-10, Healthy People.gov (last updated Aug. 28, 
2013), http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/objectives
list.aspx?topicId=23. Healthy People 2020 also sets target thresholds for 
immunizing young children aged 19–35 months (IID-7, 8, 9) and 
adolescents aged 13–15 years (IID-11). Id.  
32. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 11, at 380. 
33. See Table 1 in the Appendix for a list of all relevant statutory and 
regulatory provisions by state. 
34. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School 
Immunization Requirements, Nat’l Conference of State 
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but two states—Mississippi and West Virginia—allow exemptions 
where vaccination contravenes religious beliefs.35 Finally, nineteen 
states permit exemptions for broader reasons, where parents oppose 
vaccination for philosophical or personal reasons.36 
Although standards and processes vary, states typically require 
schools and child care facilities to keep records of enrollees’ 
vaccination statuses and report annually to public health officials.37 
These data are then aggregated by state health officials and reported 
to the CDC for surveillance.38 The CDC data are published in its 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, copies of which are publicly 
available through the CDC website.39 Additionally, some states 
require that schools and day-care facilities make the “number of non-
immunized children”40 or “aggregated immunization rates”41 publicly 
available. 
Troubling to many public health officials are the recent increases 
in exemptions, particularly at the local school and community levels.42 
As the CDC explains, while “vaccination coverage and exemptions 
aggregated at national or state levels [may be at or close to target 
levels, they] can mask substantial vulnerability at the local level.”43  
Legislatures (Dec. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-
immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx; see also Table 1 in the Appendix 
(listing relevant statutory and regulatory provisions by state). 
35. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 34.  
36. Id.  
37. Gostin, supra note 11, at 380; see also Table 1 in the Appendix (listing 
state statutes and regulations that call for vaccination coverage and often 
include reporting requirements); 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, 
supra note 6, at 647 (describing the data collection process for the report). 
38. 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, supra note 6, at 647. 
39. See Vaccination Coverage Articles & Reports, Centers for Disease 
Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers 
/coverage/articles.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2014). 
40. Ill. Adm. Code tit. 89, § 407.310(a)(9) (2013) (“The number of non-
immunized children on the list shall be available to [day-care] parents who 
request it.”). 
41. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1121(c) (2012) (“To the extent permitted under 
the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 
104-191, all schools and child care facilities shall make publicly available 
the aggregated immunization rates of the student body for each required 
vaccine using a standardized form that shall be created by the department 
of health.”). 
42. See, e.g., 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, supra note 6, at 647 
(“Although statewide levels of vaccination coverage are at or very near 
target levels, locally low vaccination coverage for extremely 
transmissible diseases such as measles remains a threat to health.”). 
43. Id. at 651 (discussing MMR coverage). 
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Researchers have identified several factors that significantly increase 
exemption rates, including: (1) offering personal belief or philosophical 
exemptions instead of only medical and religious exemptions44 and 
(2) permitting exemptions through an “easier” process, such as, for 
example, parents signing a template form versus meeting with a 
physician or submitting a notarized form.45 Overall, however, 
exemptions are on the rise in all states, including those that offer only 
medical and religious exemptions and those with relatively difficult 
exemption processes.46  
C. Effect of Exemptions on Individuals and Communities 
Not vaccinating a child impacts both the unvaccinated child and 
the larger community. At the individual level, an unvaccinated child 
has been shown to be 2247–3548 times more likely to contract measles 
compared to vaccinated children, and 5.9 times more likely to 
contract pertussis.49 Contracting measles then puts a child at risk for 
“ear infection, pneumonia, seizures, brain damage, and death,”50 while 
contracting pertussis can lead to complications such as “pneumonia, 
seizures, and brain damage.”51 These complications give rise to long 
 
44. Omer et al., supra note 2, at 1759 (“States that offered personal belief 
exemptions had higher rates of exemptions than states that only offered 
religious exemptions for each year from 2001 through 2004 (P<.01).”); 
Saad B. Omer et. al., Letter to the Editor, Vaccination Policies and 
Rates of Exemption From Immunization, 2005–2011, 367 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1170, 1170–71 (2012). 
45. See Omer et al., supra note 2, at 1760; see also Stephanie Stadlin et al., 
Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the United 
States—Association of State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates 
(2004–2011), 206 J. Infectious Disease 989, 991 (2012) (“Compared 
to states with difficult medical exemption criteria, medical exemption rates 
were significantly higher in states with easy or medium criteria . . . .”). 
46. Omer et al., supra note 44, at 1170–71. 
47. Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and 
Pertussis Associated With Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 
284 JAMA 3145, 3147 (2000). 
48. Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and 
Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization Laws: Individual and 
Societal Risk of Measles, 281 JAMA 47, 49 (1999). 
49. Feikin et al., supra note 47, at 3147 (noting that the calculated pertussis 
risk was “likely an underestimate”). 
50. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccine Information 
Statement: Measles, Mumps, Rubella, & Varicella 1 (May 21, 
2010) [hereinafter MMRV VIS].  
51. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccine Information 
Statement: Multiple Vaccines 2 (Nov. 16, 2012), [hereinafter 
Multiple VIS]. 
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hospital stays52 and likely many sleepless nights for parents and 
families, not to mention steep financial consequences.53  
At the community level, vaccine exemptions put communities at 
an increased risk for vaccine-preventable outbreaks that can be costly 
on multiple levels. One group of researchers found that for a school 
population, every one percent increase in exemptions corresponded 
with a twelve percent increased risk of a pertussis outbreak.54 An 
outbreak can be costly to a community not only in terms of health 
risks, but also from a financial perspective. A 2008 San Diego measles 
outbreak cost a total of $176,980, which included an average of $775 
paid by the families of seventy-three quarantined children and 
$124,517 in other containment costs paid by the county.55 
From an individual health perspective, increased outbreaks expose 
vulnerable individuals in a community—those who rely on the 
creation of herd immunity—to preventable diseases that can lead to 
dangerous complications. “Herd immunity” occurs when a threshold 
proportion is vaccinated against a disease such that the disease can no 
longer be transmitted in the community.56 The threshold levels vary 
by disease and range from eighty percent for polio to more than 
ninety percent for measles.57 Those who rely on the indirect protection 
of herd immunity cannot receive direct protection through 
vaccination, such as children who are too young to be vaccinated and 
children who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons.58 Because 
these children “are often more susceptible to the complications of 
infectious diseases than the general population of children,” their 
reliance on herd immunity becomes that much more crucial.59 
 
52. See, e.g., Rachel M. Cunningham et al., Vaccine-Preventable 
Disease: The Forgotten Story 9, 25 (2d. ed. 2010) (describing hospital 
stays of three weeks and one month for two children diagnosed with Hib). 
53. Id. at 17 (describing how one family’s medical bills reached close to 
$10,000 after their three-year-old son contracted rotavirus and required 
hospitalization for four days). 
54. Feikin et al., supra note 47, at 3148. 
55. Christine Parkins, Note, Protecting the Herd: A Public Health, Economics, 
and Legal Argument for Taxing Parents Who Opt-Out of Mandatory 
Childhood Vaccinations, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 437, 438–39 (2012). 
56. Malone & Hinman, supra note 21, at 340; see also Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Parent’s Guide to Childhood 
Immunizations 37 (2d ed. 2010), [hereinafter CDC Parent’s Guide] 
(explaining that when a significant number of people are vaccinated, a 
disease will have “nowhere to go” and will thus “die out”). 
57. Malone & Hinman, supra note 21, at 340.  
58. Id.  
59. Omer et al., Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of 
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 1981, 1984 (2009). 
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Additionally, up to ten percent of vaccinated children do not develop 
immunity and are thus dependent on the indirect benefits of herd 
immunity.60 Unfortunately, these vulnerable children have contracted 
vaccine-preventable diseases during outbreaks that began in exempted 
children.61  
D. Negative Externalities and Strategies to Address Them 
The consequences of nonmedical vaccine exemptions felt by 
communities and vulnerable third persons can be described as 
negative externalities.62 Several theories have been implemented and 
proposed to reduce the number of nonmedical exemptions or, 
alternatively, help parents realize the full costs of their decision to 
forgo vaccination. One approach taken by some states, including 
Washington, California, and Vermont, involves making the exemption 
process more difficult in an effort to reduce the number of requested 
exemptions.63 New York City, on the other hand, reportedly assessed 
fines as high as $2,000 a day against schools that allow unvaccinated 
children to attend classes, thus encouraging institutions to promote 
vaccination.64 Other theories proposed by legal scholars include taxing  
60. See CDC Parent’s Guide, supra note 56, at 32; see also Malone & 
Hinman, supra note 21, at 340 (discussing herd immunity’s indirect 
protection of people “who receive[ ] vaccine[s] but are not protected (i.e., 
vaccine failures)”); Cunningham, supra note 52, at 9 (describing a girl 
who, although vaccinated, did not develop immunity due to a rare 
immune deficiency disorder). 
61. Malone & Hinman, supra note 21, at 355–56 (discussing a 2005 measles 
outbreak that “extended beyond the community of vaccination objectors 
to impact exposed hospitalized children who were too young to be 
vaccinated”); see also Feikin et al., supra note 47, at 3148 (presenting 
the results of a Colorado study where at least eleven percent of 
vaccinated children contracted measles through exposure to an 
exempted child); Salmon et al., supra note 48, at 51 (discussing previous 
outbreaks where infection initiated in exempt individuals and 
subsequently spread to vaccinated people). 
62. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary 664 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “negative 
externality” as “[a]n externality that is detrimental to another, such as 
water pollution created by a nearby factory”). 
63. Sabrina Tavernise, Washington State Makes It Harder to Opt Out of 
Immunizations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2012, at A18; Mike Roe with 
Stephanie O’Neil, Gov. Brown Signs Bill Making It Harder for Parents to 
Get Vaccination Exemptions for Their Kids, Southern California 
Public Radio (Sept. 30, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/news
/2012/09/30/10242/gov-brown-signs-bill-making-it-harder-parents-get-/; 
Tara Haelle, US States Make Opting Out of Vaccinations 
Harder, Nature (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.nature.com/news/
us-states-make-opting-out-of-vaccinations-harder-1.11548. 
64. Anthony Ciolli, Religious & Philosophical Exemptions to Mandatory 
School Vaccinations: Who Should Bear the Costs to Society?, 74 Mo. L. 
Rev. 287, 294 (2009). 
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parents who forgo vaccination for nonmedical reasons,65 holding 
parents liable in tort for damages incurred,66 and allowing for a 
nuisance claim against parents whose children are not vaccinated for 
nonmedical reasons.67  
While these interventions attempt to reduce exemptions or 
compensate injured third parties for the damages incurred, this Note 
proposes a different approach—imposing a duty to warn so the 
negative externalities can be avoided or at least mitigated. 
II. Legal Basis for the Proposed Duty to Warn  
The law recognizes in several substantive areas the fact that 
adequate warning of nonobvious risks can allow individuals to avoid 
injury in the first place or, at a minimum, make an informed choice. 
Unlike the strategies discussed in Part I.C., a duty to warn permits 
free will so long as risks are disclosed and simultaneously protects 
vulnerable individuals by facilitating informed decisions and reduced 
exposure to potential harm. In the childhood vaccine context, 
imposing a duty to warn—based on those imposed by general 
negligence law, products liability law, and the Food Allergen Labeling 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2004—provides a mechanism for 
balancing the interests of vulnerable individuals relying on herd 
immunity and individuals who wish to forgo vaccination for religious 
or philosophical reasons. Although some precedent exists with regard 
to infectious disease cases, the duty to warn imposed by past courts 
can be readily distinguished from the proposed duty to warn. 
A. Negligent Failure to Warn 
The duty to warn imposed by common law theories of negligence 
can inform a potential duty to warn in the vaccine exemption context. 
In negligence cases, lack of reasonable care can be established where 
an individual fails to warn of a dangerous risk that (1) arose out of 
the defendant’s actions, (2) was actually or constructively known by 
the defendant, (3) would not be readily realized by potential victims, 
 
65. Parkins, supra note 55, at 437; see also Karin Schumacher, Note, 
Informed Consent: Should It Be Extended to Vaccinations?, 
22 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 89, 118 (1999) (comparing a vaccine-refusal 
tax to the excise tax already in effect for cigarettes). 
66. Rebecca Rodal & Kumanan Wilson, Could Parents Be Held Liable for 
Not Immunizing Their Children?, 4 McGill J. L. & Health 39 (2010) 
(discussing the challenges and opportunities for tort liability). 
67. Alexandra M. Stewart, Commentary, Challenging Personal Belief 
Immunization Exemptions: Considering Legal Responses, 107 Mich. L. 
Rev. First Impressions 105 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org
/assets/fi/107/stewart.pdf (arguing for the use of public nuisance law to 
hold parents liable). 
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and (4) could be reduced with adequate notice.68 Thus, an individual 
can act negligently through direct conduct69 and by failing to warn of 
certain hazards. In fact, some conduct and resulting risks may be 
reasonable on their own, but become unreasonable when combined 
with a failure to warn.70 This basic concept applies with particular 
force to the context of vaccine exemptions. Obtaining an exemption 
and the resulting threat to herd immunity may not be unreasonable 
in isolation, but the failure to warn vulnerable individuals relying on 
that herd immunity—by parents, schools or others71—can render the 
unknown risk exposure unreasonable. 
Several other negligence concepts offer support for a duty to warn 
for vaccine exemptions. In negligence cases, no warning is required 
where the hazard is considered “[g]enerally appreciated,” meaning 
that it is or should be recognized “by persons whose intelligence and 
experience are within the normal range.”72 In the case of vaccine 
exemptions, the risk of unvaccinated children in a school or other 
facility73 would not be considered generally appreciated for two 
reasons. First, individual immunization status is protected as private 
health information74 and education records.75 Second, government and 
 
68. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & 
Emotional Harm § 18(a) (2010). 
69. See id. § 7(a). 
70. Id. § 18 cmt. h. 
71. See infra Part III for further discussion of who should bear the burden 
of warning vulnerable individuals. 
72. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & 
Emotional Harm § 18 cmt. f. 
73. See infra Part III for further discussion of which facilities should be 
required to warn vulnerable individuals. 
74. Individually identifiable immunization records kept by a healthcare provider 
as part of a patient’s medical record are protected by the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.103 (2011) (defining “individually identifiable health information” and 
“protected health information”). As protected health information, 
immunization records cannot be disclosed except as allowed by the Privacy 
Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2011). Notably, covered entities may disclose 
protected health information, without consent, for public health purposes, 
including “preventing or controlling disease . . . public health surveillance, 
public health investigations, and public health interventions.” 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2011). 
75. Individual immunization records kept by an elementary or secondary school 
as part of a student’s education record typically qualify for protection under 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Joint Guidance on 
the Application of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to Student Records 3–4 
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public health officials typically report aggregate exemption data at 
the state and national levels rather than at the local and school 
levels.76 Admittedly, a concerned parent could call school or public 
health officials to learn the aggregate exemptions for a school or area; 
however, this ability to obtain information differs significantly from a 
proactive duty to warn and fails to alert well-meaning parents who 
fail to inquire for various reasons. Therefore, because the risk of 
unvaccinated children is not “generally appreciated,” a duty to warn 
would be appropriate by the standards used in negligence cases. 
Moreover, by requiring a warning as part of reasonable conduct, 
negligence law gives potential victims three important opportunities: 
to change course and avoid the risk altogether;77 to press forward after 
weighing the benefits and risks posed;78 to or reduce the severity of 
any inevitable damages.79 Similarly, a vulnerable individual who relies 
on herd immunity stands in an excellent position to mitigate should 
she receive adequate warning: she could change course—for example, 
by attending an alternative school—to avoid an unreasonably high 
risk; she could weigh the risks and benefits to make an informed 
decision—for example, attending a prestigious school that has a 
higher number of unvaccinated students; or she could minimize the 
risk incurred by wearing a mask or taking other preventive measures. 
Because the potential victim, here a vulnerable individual relying on 
herd immunity, can, upon adequate warning, act to avoid or reduce 
the harm suffered, a duty to warn would be an appropriate 
mechanism for reducing the negative externalities of nonmedical 
vaccine exemptions.  
(2008). As such, individual students’ records generally cannot be disclosed 
to third parties unless parents provide written consent. Id. at 4. Some 
exceptions to the consent requirement include sharing records with teachers 
and other school officials who have “legitimate educational interests.” Id. 
(quoting 34 CFR § 99.31(a)(1) (2007)). 
76. See, e.g., 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, supra note 6, at 648–51 
(reporting vaccination coverage and exemptions by state). But see Ryann 
Grochowski, San Diego County Kindergarten Vaccination Rates 2012–
2013, inewsource.org, http://inewsource.org/data-tables/sandiego-
vaccination-exemption-map-2012/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (allowing 
people to search for local San Diego schools by location or name and find 
school-specific exemption information).  
77. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & 
Emotional Harm § 18 cmt. b (2010) (“A pilot, for example, can alter 
the route to avoid a protruding structure . . . .”). 
78. Id. (“[H]aving been informed of the risks of surgery, a patient may 
decline to undergo surgery . . . .”). 
79. Id. (“For example, by the time one skier is able to warn another, a 
collision between the two of them may be inevitable; nevertheless, the 
warning may be effective in reducing the force of the collision and hence 
in reducing the severity of the resulting injuries.”). 
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B. Product Defect Liability and Allergen Warnings  
Products liability law also utilizes a duty to warn to reduce 
negative externalities. The law considers a product “defective” when 
(1) the product poses foreseeable risks, (2) those risks could be 
avoided or mitigated through reasonable instruction or warning, and 
(3) the instructions or warnings are inadequate for the 
circumstances.80 In the context of products liability, the law seeks to 
“creat[e] incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of 
safety in designing and marketing products.”81 Realizing that 
“[s]ociety does not benefit from products that are excessively safe—for 
example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of twenty miles 
per hour—any more than it benefits from products that are too 
risky,” the law seeks to promote “optimal” product safety levels.82 In 
the context of vaccine exemptions, a duty to warn would encourage 
schools, day-care facilities, and other entities83 to reach the optimal 
safety level by monitoring vaccine exemptions and, if necessary, to 
take steps to encourage increased vaccination. Such steps could, for 
example, include educating parents not only about the risks and 
benefits vaccines pose to the individual being vaccinated, but also the 
risks and benefits to the public and those who rely on herd immunity 
for protection.84 Thus, a duty to warn in the context of vaccine 
exemptions finds further support in general products liability law. 
Further analysis of products liability law reveals a particularly on-
point comparison: allergy warnings. As a general rule, entities must 
give warning where a product contains a “harm-causing 
ingredient . . . to which a substantial number of persons are 
allergic.”85 Substantiality, while not clearly defined, typically involves 
two considerations: rarity and severity.86 For the first consideration, 
the allergy cannot be unique to the plaintiff and must be sufficiently 
common.87 In the context of vaccine exemptions, it is manifest from 
public health reports that numerous children are naturally susceptible 
or “allergic” to areas of high exemptions and threatened herd 
 
80. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) (1998). 
81. Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
82. Id. 
83. See infra Part III for further discussion of which entities should be 
subject to the warning requirement. 
84. See infra Part III.B for further discussion on herd immunity education. 
85. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. k 
(1998). 
86. Id.  
87. Id.  
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immunity.88 That is, children who receive medical exemptions are 
naturally susceptible or “allergic,”89 while children who receive 
nonmedical (i.e., religious or philosophical) exemptions, while also 
susceptible because of their unvaccinated status, actually represent 
the voluntarily added threat to herd immunity—the “allergen” to be 
avoided if possible—through their parents’ decisions to forgo 
vaccination.  
The second factor for substantiality—severity—also applies with 
great force in the vaccine context. In product liability cases, courts 
consider the severity of harm when deciding whether a warning should 
be required.90 Furthermore, a severe, albeit less frequent, allergy can 
justify requiring a warning.91 Vaccine-preventable diseases such as 
polio, pertussis, Hib, and pneumococcal disease can lead to paralysis; 
pneumonia; seizures; brain damage; meningitis (infection in the brain 
and spinal cord); infection in the blood, joints, bones, ears, and outer 
heart covering; deafness; and, in the worst cases, death.92 Certainly 
these harms would be considered severe enough to warrant warning 
even where a small percentage of the population is susceptible.93 
Two other allergy warning concepts can be applied to a vaccine 
coverage warning. First, similar to the “generally appreciated” 
standard used in general negligence cases,94 products liability law 
requires manufacturers to give warning only where the allergen’s 
 
88. Just over 11,000 children enrolled in kindergarten for the 2011–12 school 
year reported receiving medical exemptions. 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten 
Report, supra note 6, at 650–51. 
89. All states allow medical exemptions where vaccination is medically 
contraindicated (that is, a doctor certifies the child will likely suffer 
adverse effects from a vaccine). Examples include children with 
compromised immune systems—such as those being treated for cancer—
and children with confirmed allergies to vaccine ingredients. Gostin, 
supra note 11, at 380. 
90. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 
cmt. k (1998). 
91. Id. (“The more severe the harm, the more justified is a conclusion that 
the number of persons at risk need not be large to be considered 
‘substantial’ so as to require a warning. Essentially, this reflects the 
same risk-utility balancing undertaken in warnings cases generally. But 
courts explicitly impose the requirement of substantiality in cases 
involving adverse allergic reactions.”). 
92. Multiple VIS, supra note 51, at 2. 
93. The 11,000 medically exempted children, see supra note 88, represented 
between 0.0% and 1.3% of the total kindergarten enrollees in the various 
fifty states. 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, supra note 6, at 650–51. 
94. See supra Part II.A. 
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“danger or . . . presence . . . is not generally known to consumers.”95 
While the harm presented by unvaccinated children may be 
“generally known,”96 the actual presence of unvaccinated children is 
likely unknown for the reasons discussed in Part II.A. On the basis 
that unvaccinated children constitute an “unknown-ingredient” case,97 
a warning would be appropriate to alert parents of vulnerable 
“allergic” children. Also notable with product warnings, 
manufacturers are not always required to warn consumers with 
specificity of potential harms that could result from a hazardous 
ingredient; warnings as to the general risks can be sufficient in some 
circumstances.98 This nuance can inform the scope of the proposed 
warning for vaccine exemptions.99 
C. Mandated Warnings: The Food Allergen Labeling and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2004 
In addition to the common law duty to warn, in 2004, Congress 
passed the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 
2004100 (“2004 Act”) and gave the Food and Drug Administration 
authority to regulate labeling and warnings for “major food allergens,” 
including “milk, egg, fish (e.g., bass, flounder, or cod), Crustacean  
95. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. k 
(1998); see also Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 508 F.3d 11, 14–15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (characterizing the types of cases where warnings may be 
required as “unknown-harm” and “unknown-ingredient” cases).  
96. That unvaccinated children pose a threat to others is a widely available 
fact through the Internet and popular news sources. See, e.g., Art 
Caplan, Bioethicist: US Children Suffer from Vaccine Exemptions, 
NBC News (July 31, 2012, 5:29 AM), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/
2012/07/31/13036446-bioethicist-us-children-suffer-from-vaccine-exemptions
?lite (“Vaccine refusers put every other kid, baby and immune-
suppressed adult at greater risk of getting infected.”). 
97. See Mills, 508 F.3d at 14–15. 
98. See, e.g., Woeste v. Washington Platform Saloon & Rest., 836 N.E.2d 
52, 56–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (applying Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. 
§ 2307.76, which adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts: Suppliers of Chattels (1965), the precursor to Section 2 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
(1998)) (finding the following warning sufficient—despite its failure to 
warn of potential death—and consistent with both Louisiana and Texas 
law: “Consumer Information: There may be risks associated when 
consuming shell fish as in the case with other raw protein products. If 
you suffer from chronic illness of the liver, stomach or blood, or if you 
are pregnant or if you have other immune disorders, you should eat 
these products fully cooked.”).  
99. See infra Part III for further discussion of the proposed vaccine 
exemption warning, including the scope of disclosure. 
100. Pub. L. No. 108-282, 118 Stat. 905 (codified in scattered sections of 
21 U.S.C.).  
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shellfish (e.g., crab, lobster, or shrimp), tree nuts (e.g., almonds, 
pecans, or walnuts), wheat, peanuts, and soybeans.”101 This law gave 
rise to the commonly used warning “Contains [major food 
allergen].”102  
As rationale for the law, Congress found, among other things, 
that (1) “approximately 2 percent of adults and about 5 percent of 
infants and young children in the United States suffer from food 
allergies,” (2) “each year, roughly 30,000 individuals require 
emergency room treatment and 150 individuals die because of allergic 
reactions to food,” (3) “at present, there is no cure for food allergies,” 
and (4) “a food allergic consumer must avoid the food to which the 
consumer is allergic.”103 Similar rationale exists in support of a vaccine 
exemption warning: (1) depending on the state, up to 1.3% of enrolled 
kindergarteners are unable to receive vaccines for medical reasons and 
are thus reliant on herd immunity for protection from diseases such as 
polio pertussis, Hib, and pneumococcal disease that can cause harms 
that include paralysis and death;104 (2) infants and other young 
children rely on herd immunity for protection until they reach the 
appropriate age for vaccination;105 and (3) vulnerable children and 
adults can reduce their risk of contracting a vaccine-preventable 
disease by reducing their exposure to unvaccinated children, who are 
susceptible to infection.106  
Furthermore, because the presence of unvaccinated children in 
schools, day cares, and local geographic areas is not readily 
apparent107—similar to the inadequate food warnings prior to the 2004 
Act—a statutorily imposed warning system could be an appropriate 
method of imposing a duty to warn for vaccine exemptions. Finally, 
 
101. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(qq), 343(w) (2012). 
102. § 343(w)(1)(A). 
103. § 202, 118 Stat. at 906. 
104. 2011–12 CDC Kindergarten Report, supra note 6, at 650–51 (reporting 
the percentage of children enrolled in kindergarten in each state who 
received a medical exemption); Gostin, supra note 11, at 380 
(explaining that medical contraindications to vaccines can include a 
known allergy or a compromised immune system); Multiple VIS, 
supra note 51, at 2; MMRV VIS, supra note 50, at 1 (indicating 
children should not receive MMRV vaccines if they have a life-
threatening allergy to vaccine components or a compromised immune 
system due to illness (e.g., HIV/AIDS or cancer) or ongoing treatment). 
105. See Multiple VIS, supra note 51, at 3 (recommending vaccinations 
begin at birth for hepatitis B and at two months of age for all other 
diseases and end via final dosing at four months to six years, depending 
on the disease). 
106. See supra Part I.C. 
107. See supra Part II.A. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
May Contain Unvaccinated Children 
1885 
Congress noted in its findings that inconsistencies in food labeling 
prevented consumers from accurately discerning which foods actually 
contained the major food allergens they meant to avoid.108 By giving 
the FDA authority to regulate food allergen warnings, Congress thus 
attempted to standardize warnings and increase their utility to 
consumers. This strategy can be particularly instructive in the context 
of a vaccine exemption warning because herd immunity threshold 
levels, the basis of the information to be conveyed in the warning, can 
be complex and is not necessarily well understood by the public. 
Thus, a standardized and easily understood warning—similar to those 
prescribed by the 2004 Act—represents a potential highly effective 
method of conveying vaccine exemption information to consumers. 
D. Application in Infectious Disease Cases 
Courts’ rulings with regard to contagious diseases and a duty to 
warn can be both distinguished from and informative to the proposed 
vaccine exemption warning. To begin, courts hold that doctors and 
hospitals are not required to warn the public when a patient is known 
to be infected with a communicable disease.109 These cases can be 
distinguished, however, because the patients were already infected 
and public policy suggested a duty to warn would be both 
unreasonable110 and impractical.111 These holdings should not diminish 
the validity of a statutorily imposed warning for two reasons. First, 
even without active infection, unvaccinated children pose a threat to 
herd immunity and, in particular, to the medically exempted children 
who rely on that herd immunity.112 Second, the proposed duty to 
warn and regulation would limit the duty so as to make it both 
reasonable and practical.113 
Many jurisdictions already find it proper to impose a duty to 
warn where a special relationship exists or where a disease is 
 
108. § 202(4), 118 Stat. at 906. 
109. Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984) (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ argument that doctor “owed the public the duty of ordinary 
care to protect them from the diseases of his patients”); Derrick v. 
Ontario Cmty. Hosp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 566, 571 (Ct. App. 1975) (“It 
would impose an intolerable burden upon Hospital to notify all members 
of the public that one of its patients being released from the hospital is 
suffering from a contagious, communicable disease.”). 
110. Gammill, 727 F.2d at 954 (agreeing with the district court and finding 
that a duty to warn the public “would constitute an ‘unreasonable 
burden’ upon physicians”). 
111. Derrick, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 571 (“We can think of no way in which 
Hospital could discharge such a duty.”). 
112. See supra Part I.C. 
113. See infra Part III. 
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particularly devastating. Thus, while courts decline to impose a duty 
to warn the public of an infected individual, they do hold that a 
doctor114 or employer115 should give warning to an infected patient’s 
family members and others who are known to be in close contact with 
the patient. Additionally, where a patient is infected with the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which gives rise to the currently 
incurable acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a doctor is 
required to warn the patient of her disease status and how to reduce 
risk of transmission to others.116 Furthermore, the patient herself may 
be liable if she fails to notify a person who may be exposed to a 
sexually transmitted disease, including HIV/AIDS, through intimate 
relations or other risky behavior.117  
 
114. See, e.g., Gammill, 727 F.2d at 954 (“A physician may be found liable 
for failing to warn a patient’s family, treating attendants, or other 
persons likely to be exposed to the patient, of the nature of the disease 
and the danger of exposure.” (citation omitted)); see also Bradshaw v. 
Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 871 (Tenn. 1993) (recognizing the duty imposed 
by Gammill and citing eight states’ similar rulings and three treatises in 
support of the duty). 
115. Bolieu v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 953 P.2d 1233, 1241 (Alaska 
1998) (finding in a staph infection case that a “health care facility owes 
a duty of care to the spouses of its nursing assistants to take reasonable 
measures to minimize the spread of infection, including informing its 
nursing assistants of the risks of exposure”); see also Redditt v. 
BellSouth Telecomms., No. 3:09cv21/MD, 2009 WL 1659367, at *3 
(N.D. Fla. June 11, 2009) (declining to find as a matter of law that 
employer did not owe a duty to employee’s spouse after methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) outbreak at company). 
116. See, e.g., Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 518, 523 
(Ct. App. 1995) (“[W]e believe that a doctor who knows he is dealing 
with the 20th Century version of Typhoid Mary ought to have a very 
strong incentive to tell his patient what she ought to do and not do and 
how she ought to comport herself in order to prevent the spread of her 
disease.” (footnote omitted)); see also Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 
62 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tenn. 2001) (“The duty contemplated here is not one 
to warn [plaintiff] himself of [plaintiff’s spouse’s] exposure to HIV but to 
warn [plaintiff’s spouse] so that she might take adequate precautions to 
prevent transmission of the disease to [plaintiff] and their child.”). 
117. See generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical & Emotional Harm § 18 cmt. a (2010) (“[T]he defendant 
who is about to come into intimate contact with the plaintiff can be 
negligent for failing to warn the plaintiff that the defendant suffers from 
a communicable disease.”) (citing B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 
1988) (genital herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1988) (genital herpes); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 
1989) (venereal disease); Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074 (Okla. 
1997) (genital herpes)); see also Gostin, supra note 11, at 305–06 
(citing McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998) (human 
papilloma virus); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sheft, 989 F.2d 1105 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (HIV); Eric L. Schulman, Note, Sleeping with the Enemy: 
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These holdings apply to the vaccine exemption context in several 
ways. First, the proposed duty to warn will impose the duty on 
entities such as schools, day-care facilities, and pediatrician offices 
that bear a closer “relationship” with medically exempted children: 
these entities are where children are most likely to be exposed to 
unvaccinated children (1) for extended periods of time or (2) who 
have contracted a vaccine-preventable disease and are seeking 
treatment. Second, although—unlike the cited viral infections—some 
of the vaccine-preventable diseases are treatable,118 many have serious 
implications such as paralysis, deafness, and death.119 Thus, case law 
where courts recognized a duty to warn, albeit in limited situations, 
provides further support for imposing a duty to warn in the context of 
vaccine exemptions. 
III. Proposed Duty to Warn and Regulation 
This Note proposes a statutory warning system as a means of 
reducing harm to individuals who cannot be vaccinated due to 
medical reasons or young age. By implementing a uniform warning 
system that is easily understood, states can empower their citizens to 
make informed decisions regarding their children’s care. Specifically, a 
warning system would allow people to minimize vulnerable children’s 
exposure to areas with high vaccine exemption rates. Reduced 
exposure translates into reduced incidence of infectious, vaccine-
preventable diseases that can lead to dangerous complications and 
even death. Otherwise stated, reduced exposure through a warning 
system can lead to reduced harm. 
The proposed scope and statutory considerations, outlined in this 
Part, represent one of many possible frameworks for a warning 
system. While putting forth a comprehensive discussion of potential 
benefits and limitations, this Note, at its core, aims to propose  
and discuss a framework that could be modified based on local  
community needs. 
A. Scope and Statutory Considerations  
Although the statute could be state- or federal-based in theory, 
state authority seems most likely given the current role states play in 
regulating public health, vaccines, and education under the police 
 
Combatting the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS Through a Heightened 
Legal Duty, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 957 (1996)). 
118. Bacterial infections such as pertussis, tetanus, and Hib are treatable 
with antibiotics. Viral infections such as polio, measles, mumps, and 
rubella, however, cannot be treated directly; only symptoms can be 
addressed while the patient’s immune system fights the infection.  
119. Multiple VIS, supra note 51, at 2. 
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power. The federal government could supplement states’ efforts, 
however, by encouraging adoption of a standardized system through 
conditional funding for schools, vaccines, or health care.120 
Implementing a national standard would help inform interstate 
consumers (that is, individuals moving from one state to another), 
but more research is needed to determine if state variances make a 
national standard impractical. The remainder of this analysis assumes 
a state-based statute and warning system enforced by the agency 
tasked with enforcing current vaccination requirements. 
The warning system would consist of a standard format for 
publicly posting where an entity falls on the vaccine coverage 
spectrum. The recommended covered entities include schools and 
child care facilities because they are currently regulated by states with 
regard to required vaccines, record keeping, and reporting. If this 
program proves successful, expansion to pediatrician offices could be 
feasible given the quasi-enrollment status of patients and already-
collected vaccination records. Further expansion to other entities such 
as gyms, little league teams, or library programs could follow; 
however, barriers to expansion include (1) needing a defined 
population of “enrolled” children for calculation of coverage levels and 
(2) public resistance to exposing personal health information and the 
risk of entities, not accustomed to dealing with health records, 
improperly disclosing such information. When considering expansion 
beyond schools and day cares, state should balance the barriers and 
administrative costs with the benefits (that is, total harm that could 
be avoided). 
The three levels of vaccine coverage correspond with a familiar 
classification system: green means good or safe, yellow indicates 
caution, and red points to danger. The actual threshold vaccination 
levels for green, yellow, and red could be based on various 
benchmarks, including the Healthy People 2020 goal of maintaining 
ninety-five percent vaccination for DTAP (immunizing against 
diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis), MMR (immunizing 
against measles, mumps, and rubella), polio, hepatitis B, and 
varicella.121 Using Healthy People 2020 as a guide, green could be 
defined as ninety-five percent and above; yellow between ninety and 
ninety-five percent; and red below ninety percent. States could also 
consider the estimated herd immunity thresholds for individual 
diseases122 or create green, yellow, and red levels that include different 
 
120. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or 
Crowding Out?: Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care 
Policy, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, 199, 210–11 (2011) (discussing the 
requirements for federal conditional spending). 
121. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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coverage levels for different diseases. Depending on the current and 
target vaccination levels at local and state levels, a state could 
consider the above-mentioned values—based on Healthy People 
2020—either overly conservative or overly liberal. Thus, flexibility is 
necessary to ensure states and localities can implement systems that 
serve to warn individuals in a meaningful way. 
Combining the color classifications with emotion graphics—for 
example, a happy face with green and a sad face with red—could 
further enhance the system’s effect on consumer and school behavior. 
In a study123 described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein,124 nearly 
three hundred California households were given information about 
their energy use and the average energy use for their neighborhood. In 
response to this feedback, the above-average users reduced their 
energy usage, but the below-average users actually increased their 
usage—demonstrating the “boomerang effect.”125 Half of the 
households, however, received a nonverbal sign indicating that their 
energy use was “socially approved” as below average or “socially 
disapproved” as above average. The approval or disapproval was 
communicated through the emotion graphics of a smiling face or a 
frowning face, respectively. Interestingly, the emotional icons resulted 
in a larger reduction for above-average users and diminished the 
boomerang effect.126  
Leveraging this insight, states could use emotional graphics to 
communicate social approval of high vaccination rates (smiling face 
with green) and social disapproval of low vaccination rates (concerned 
face with yellow, frowning face with red), thus encouraging schools to 
take steps to maintain or increase their coverage rates accordingly. 
Consumers, likewise, could be encouraged to choose the socially 
acceptable green schools even if their children were not unvaccinated 
and at known high risk levels. This consumer effect is especially 
desirable because up to ten percent of children do not develop 
immunity from vaccination, although this vulnerability will not be 
known until a child contracts a disease for which he or she received 
vaccination.127  
To ensure long-term effectiveness, the statute should require the 
enforcing agency to develop evaluation metrics and processes. For 
example, officials could review outbreaks of vaccine-preventable 
 
123. P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and 
Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 Psychol. Sci. 429 (2007). 
124. Richard H. Thaler & Cass. R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 69–70 (2009).  
125. Id.  
126. Id. 
127. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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diseases and, in particular, the number of children infected by 
category: too young to be vaccinated, medical exemption, nonmedical 
exemption, and vaccinated but low or no immunity (that is, vaccine 
failures). Another easily quantifiable metric could be community and 
state vaccination levels. Coverage levels could be compared before and 
after the warning to assess the program’s effectiveness at one, five, 
and ten years. Further interventions could then be pursued if goals for 
any of the metrics (outbreaks, incidence rates in medically exempt 
and vaccine failure individuals, or coverage levels) are not met.  
B. Potential Benefits 
There are many benefits and opportunities presented by the 
proposed warning system. To begin, the system could go hand-in-
hand with education on vaccinations and herd immunity. In one 
instance, a state could combine its system launch with a public 
education campaign to ensure people understand the system and what 
it communicates. Additionally, particularly in states that allow easy 
transfers between school districts,128 market forces could encourage 
schools to implement education programs so their vaccination levels 
rise to the socially acceptable “green” zone. 
These education opportunities can take many forms and serve 
many purposes. With regard to form, information on the community 
benefits of vaccination could be included in the informed consent 
process, as Wendy Parmet suggests,129 or distributed by schools and 
day-care facilities. Federal law requires healthcare providers to give 
patients, or their parent or legal guardian, a copy of all applicable 
Vaccine Information Sheets before administering any vaccinations.130 
These sheets are created and maintained by the CDC;131 however, 
they focus on the individual risks of vaccination and only marginally 
mention a community benefit: “[w]hen vaccination rates go down, 
disease rates go up.”132 In contrast, the CDC’s Parent’s Guide to 
Childhood Immunizations clearly explains the protective role of herd 
 
128. Andy Gammill, More Students Are Crossing District Lines: Families 
Take Advantage of Change in State Law that Slashed Cost of Attending 
Another School, Indianapolis Star, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1.  
129. Wendy E. Parmet, Populations, Public Health, and the Law 
201–03 (2009).  
130. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26(d) (2006). 
131. Current versions of the Vaccine Information Sheets can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/index.html. 
132. Multiple VIS, supra note 51, at 1; see also Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Vaccine Information Statement: 
Measles, Mumps & Rubella 1 (Apr. 20, 2012) (“But if we stopped 
vaccinating [the diseases] would return.”). 
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immunity for vulnerable children and vaccine failures133 and compares 
an individual’s decision to voluntarily forgo vaccination and rely on 
herd immunity to carpooling but never contributing for gas.134 
Perhaps states, schools, and day-care facilities can utilize this CDC 
resource and other materials135 to increase parents’ awareness levels.  
Simulations offer another promising education format that could 
be effective with both children and adults. In 2012, student 
researchers at Worcester Polytechnic Institute demonstrated a viable 
interactive herd immunity simulation.136 For the simulation, 
participants were given T-shirts indicating their participation and one 
of three sticker or wristband colors: red for infected, blue for not 
vaccinated, and green for vaccinated. Day One represented no herd 
immunity: sixty-eight percent began unvaccinated (blue), twenty-
two percent began vaccinated (green), and ten percent began infected 
with the flu (red). During the day, when an infected (red) individual 
encountered an unvaccinated (blue) individual, the previously healthy 
blue individual was tagged with a red sticker and given additional 
stickers to mark others he or she subsequently infected.137 At the end 
of Day One, without herd immunity, fifty-seven students—or over 
half the population of ninety-six—contracted the flu.138 For Day Two, 
eighty percent were vaccinated (green), ten percent were unvaccinated 
(blue), and ten percent were infected (red).139 By the end of the day, 
the number of infected individual nearly doubled from six to eleven 
students, but this remained a relatively small portion of the study 
population for Day Two.140 Importantly for states, schools, and day-
care facilities, the exercise appeared to positively influence students’ 
views of vaccination.141 
With regard to the effect of educational efforts, it may be possible 
to, at a minimum, increase public understanding (and therefore, use) 
 
133. CDC Parent’s Guide, supra note 56, at 37–39. 
134. Id. at 44. 
135. See generally, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 52 (sharing twenty 
individuals’ experiences with vaccine-preventable diseases). 
136. Andrew Holmes et al., Herd Immunity and You (Feb. 20, 2012) 
(unpublished B.S. project report, Worcester Polytechnic Institute),  
http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-022012-190
547/unrestricted/Herd_Immunity_and_You.pdf. 
137. Brooke Czapkowski et al., Herd Immunity and You (unpublished B.S. 
project poster, Worcester Polytechnic Institute), http://www.wpi.edu/
Images/CMS/UGP/Herd_Immunity_and_You.pdf. 
138. Holmes et al., supra note 136, at 34. 
139. Czapkowski et al., supra note 137. 
140. Holmes et al., supra note 136, at 34. 
141. Id. at 35. 
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of the warning system and generate recognition of the risks involved 
with being in close proximity with unvaccinated individuals. But 
while researchers observe parents may be willing to vaccinate for 
altruistic reasons, the relative significance herd immunity plays in 
parents’ decisions to vaccinate is not fully understood.142 One 
encouraging study in 2011 indicated that Rachel Cunningham’s book 
Vaccine Preventable Disease: The Forgotten Story proved useful in 
direct conversations with parents and, for ninety-five percent of 
survey respondents, positively influenced at least one parent’s decision 
to vaccinate.143 At the same time, however, some parents may be 
negatively affected by herd immunity messages.144 To be effective, 
then, messages should be balanced and educational in nature, rather 
than coercive.  
Another benefit of the warning system is its inherent lack of 
coercion, particularly when compared to a mandate or other public 
health tool. Mandates in particular have a reputation for generating 
instant resistance based on liberty and government interference 
claims.145 And, unlike the recent laws passed in Washington, 
California, and Vermont,146 the proposed warning system doesn’t 
interfere with individual parents’ option to seek an exemption from 
vaccination laws. Instead, the warning system protects potential 
victims by giving adequate warning and allowing for risk avoidance 
while potentially also “nudging” entities to promote higher 
vaccination rates.147 Thus, the warning system may be more palatable 
without compromising effectiveness. 
 
142. E.g., Maheen Quadri-Sheriff et al., The Role of Herd Immunity in 
Parents’ Decision to Vaccinate Children: A Systematic Review, 
130 Pediatrics 522, 528–29 (2012). 
143. Rachel M. Cunningham, Tex. Children’s Hosp., How Book Sharing May 
Impact Vaccine Decision-Making: Is Seeing Believing?, Presentation at 
the 45th National Immunization Conference, Washington, D.C. 10 
(Mar. 29, 2011), available at https://cdc.confex.com/cdc/nic2011/web
program/Paper25485.html. 
144. Quadri-Sheriff et al., supra note 142, at 525 (“[I]n 1 study a parent 
admitted feeling resentful toward governmental health care bodies that 
suggest children should be immunized to further herd immunity for the 
benefit of society.” (citation omitted)). 
145. Wendy E. Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public 
Health Law, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 401, 410 (2011) (“Mandates may 
be relatively easy to enact and implement, but they often ignite a 
backlash that can undermine political and legal support for public 
health policy.”). 
146. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
147. See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 3–5 (introducing 
“libertarian paternalism” and “choice architecture” as a viable and more 
palatable alternative to mandates). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
May Contain Unvaccinated Children 
1893 
Finally, the warning system poses relatively low implementation 
costs if administered by an existing agency. Staff time would likely be 
the most significant cost, needed for tasks such as rule promulgation, 
setting up reporting systems and formats, revising websites and other 
materials, and compliance monitoring. Additional costs could be 
incurred if educational campaigns are paired with the system’s launch. 
These already low implementation costs could be offset, however, if 
the federal government offered funding to induce state adoption of a 
national standard.148 
C. Potential Limitations 
There are several potential limitations to a warning system. First, 
unlike a mandate or restrictive exemption process, a warning does not 
directly address the risks (including high vaccination rates and 
compromised herd immunity) to which vulnerable children are 
exposed. Instead, the warning system, on its face, empowers 
individuals to make informed choices and avoid harm from existing 
risk, meanwhile aspiring to indirectly reduce risk levels. This 
limitation, while valid, lends itself to the conclusion that a warning 
will not be effective in isolation. Rather, current state laws requiring 
vaccination as a condition to attend school or day care—facilitating 
risk reduction—are essential components of a comprehensive 
vaccination strategy that includes a warning system to facilitate  
risk avoidance. 
Second, the warning system is limited in its effect where 
individuals may be warned but unable to avoid the risk. For example, 
there could be only one school in a fifty mile radius, or the alternative 
school, while close, is a prohibitively expensive private school. But, as 
the Restatement authors recognized, society does not benefit from, 
nor does it encourage, elimination of all risks.149 That the warning 
system isn’t a comprehensive solution doesn’t negate its usefulness. A 
warning can still raise public awareness about vaccine coverage and 
herd immunity; encourage organizations to promote increased 
vaccination and become “green;” and, where exposure cannot be 
completely avoided, individuals and schools can work together to 
minimize a child’s risk. 
Conclusion 
Childhood vaccines have long formed the basis for intense debate 
and resistance. Currently, exemptions, while low overall, are 
increasing in all states regardless if only religious exemptions are 
permitted or if exemptions are relatively difficult to obtain—two 
 
148. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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factors associated with lower exemptions rates. Of particular concern 
are local communities with high exemption rates that can be masked 
by low state-wide exemption rates. Against this background, concern 
arises for vulnerable individuals that rely on herd immunity, or the 
indirect protection provided by having a threshold number of people 
vaccinated such that the disease cannot be transmitted in a particular 
community. Individuals relying on herd immunity include those who 
cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons or due to young age, as well 
as vaccinated individuals who did not develop immunity (vaccine 
failures). Notably, these vulnerable individuals are more likely to 
experience dangerous complications from a vaccine-preventable 
disease. To address the problem of third parties suffering because of 
some parents’ decision to voluntary forgo vaccination, policy changes 
and proposals attempt to make exemptions less accessible, shift the 
negative externalities of the decision not to vaccinate, and compensate 
victims after they contract a disease and suffer harm.  
This Note proposes another solution to address the negative 
externalities of vaccine exemption: a state-based, statutory warning 
system for schools and day-care facilities. The proposed system—with 
preset vaccination levels that correspond with green, yellow, and red 
as well as emotional graphics—would allow parents to choose schools 
and day-care facilities with an understanding of the vaccine coverage 
risk. Facilitating risk avoidance, this system would supplement other 
vaccine policies currently in place to increase vaccination rates. 
Katherine Shaw Makielski† 
  
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2014, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I 
would like to thank Interim Dean Jessica Berg and Dean of Academic 
Affairs Jonathan Entin for their candid advice and helpful guidance. I also 
thank my husband, Peter Makielski, for his unending love and support.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 4·2014 
May Contain Unvaccinated Children 
1895 
Appendix 
Table 1. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions by State—
School and Day-Care Vaccination Requirements and Exemptions150 
State 
 
Statutory Provisions 
 
Regulatory Provisions151 
 
AL Ala. Code §§ 16-30-1, -3, -4 Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-6-1-.02 
AK Alaska. Stat. §§ 14.30.125, 14.45.100 Alaska Admin. Code tit. 4, § 06.055; tit. 7, § 57.550 
AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-871 to -873 Ariz. Admin. Code §§ R9-6-702, -706 
AR Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-702  
CA Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 120335, 120365, 120370  
CO Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-4-901 to -903  
CT Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9a-79, 10-204a  
DE Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 131 16 Del. Admin. Code § 7.1 
FL Fla. Stat. § 1003.22 Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 65C-22.006 
GA Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-771  
HI Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 302A-901, -1154, -1156  
ID Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39-4801, -4802, -1118  
IL 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/27-8.1 Ill. Adm. Code tit. 89, § 407.310 
IN Ind. Code §§ 12-17.2-4-18.1, 20-34-3-2 to -3, 20-34-4-2, 20-34-4-5   
IA Iowa Code § 139A.8 Iowa Admin. Code r. 641-7.2(139A) 
KS Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-508, 72-5208 to -5209  
KY Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 213.036, 214.034 902 Ky. Admin. Regs. 2:055, 2:060 
LA La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:170 La. Admin Code tit. 28, pt. CLVII, § 303; pt. LXXIX, § 1101 
ME Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, §§ 6353, 6355 10-148-32-1 Me. Code R. § 17 
MD Md. Code Ann. Educ. § 7-403 Md. Code Regs. 10.06.04.03 to .05, 13A.16.03.04 
MA Mass. Gen Laws ch.76, § 15 105 Mass. Code. Regs. 220.400; 606 Mass. Code. Regs. 7.04 
MI Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.9208, .9215 Mich. Admin. Code r. 325.176, 400.5111 
MN Minn. Stat. § 121A.15  
MS Miss. Code Ann. § 41-23-37 15 Miss. Code R. § 15-6-8:1 to :2 
MO Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 167.181, 210.003  
 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36 for discussion relating to 
these provisions. 
151. Listed where needed to supplement the statutory provisions.  
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State 
 
Statutory Provisions 
 
Regulatory Provisions151 
 
MT Mont. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-402, -403, -405 Mont. Admin. R. 37.95.140 
NE Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-1913.01; 79-217, -221  
NV Nev. Stat. §§ 392.435, .437, .439; 432A.230 Nev. Admin. Code §§ 394.250, 392.105 
NH N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-C:20-a, :20-c  
NJ N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:1A-9, -9.1 N.J. Admin. Code §§ 8:57-4.1 to -4.4 
NM N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-5-1, -3 N.M. Code R. §§ 7.5.2.1 to .2.8;8.16.2.8(M) 
NY N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164  
NC N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 130A-155 to -157  
ND N.D. Cent. Code § 23-07-17.1  
OH Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3301.07(D)(2), 3313.671 Ohio Admin. Code 5101:2-12-37 
OK Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §§ 411, 413; tit. 70, 
§§ 1210.191 to .192  
OR Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 433.235, .267  
PA 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13-1303a 28 Pa. Code §§ 23.84, 27.77 
RI R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 16-38-2, 42-72.1-3(e)(10)  
SC S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-180 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-8 
SD S.D. Codified Laws § 13-28-7.1 S.D. Admin. R. 67:42:10:14, :42:04:06, :42:03:08 
TN Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-5001 Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-14-01-29 
TX Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 38.001 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 97.61 
UT Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-301 to -302.5  
VT Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 1120–1122  
VA Va. Code Ann. §§ 22.1-271.1 to .2; 32.1-46  
WA Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.210.080, .090  
WV W. Va. Code §§ 16-3-4, 18-28-2 W. Va. Code R. § 78-1-15 
WI Wis. Stat. § 252.04 Wis. Adm. Code DHS § 144.02 to .05 
WY Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-4-116, 21-4-309  
 
